Concerns: Before and during presentations

- Minors on Campus and Head Start:
  - Head start program
  - Preschoolers on campus
  - From the safety and security perspective, “how do we ‘wrap our arms around this?’”

- Mental health crises:
  - Student based threat assessment: how to integrate addressing threatening behavior from employees and others: ALL threats vs. just student threats.
  - Suicides and mental health on campus
  - Make sure that mental health awareness/safety includes staff.
  - Staff and employees have mental health crises: not necessarily work-related issues.

- Post-incarceration population on some campuses:
  - Re-assimilation into society
  - Campuses/institutions missing infrastructure to deal with these populations.
  - Implications for having these individuals on campuses.
  - Sex-offenders on campus

- Size of school and acquiring enough resources:
  - Ability to have teams/ enough resources to have safety amenities
  - Small schools and the issue of having enough resources
  - LARGE Schools:
    - 12 campuses
    - Challenging because of large size

- Large number of dually-enrolled students
  - High school and college
- College and other education/other institution
- Jurisdictional issues that accompany these students
  - Institutional
  - Judicial

- **K-12 schools: 0 tolerance policies that may be in effect**
  - Educational options that may be available to them only through community colleges and the colleges may not know it.
  - Ex: a student who was expelled because they had a gun on campus and then their only option now is to go to a community college and the college doesn’t know about this student’s other academic records.
  - Inter-institutional policies for handling these students.

- **Confusion when other people immediately come to the site of a crisis:**
  - How many other people from off-campus immediately show up with ideas about how things are supposed to be run.
    - Police, emergency responders: each group has their own ideas about what to do.
    - Off-duty emergency and public safety responders arrive
    - Campus responders
    - All on campus at once and it complicates a plan.
  - DP: often, people with really good intentions come to campus
    - How to manage volunteers: if people show up, choose to use them or not, but who’s in charge?
    - It is very complicated for Higher Ed institutions.
  - **SOLUTION:** DP:
    - Bond between first responders and administrators has to be made before an incident.
    - DP: How do you integrate with local first responders: Has to be synergistic.
    - GD: the more that you can integrate first responders into your plan the better.
      - GD: Everyone wants to help when the incident hits the news.
      - GD: Some time after the crisis is when it is hard to get critical resources.
      - GD: “thank you for responding immediately, we don’t need anything right now but we might need this in two weeks, would you be available then?”

- **Best Practices for an Open Campus:**
  - Problem: I understood how the security measures controlled risk at an animal research facility, and now I’m employed on a community college campus, where anyone can walk onto campus, into the bookstore, etc.: I would love to see a best practice for an “Open campus” and a risk
assessment of an open campus: what people are doing and how they are protecting their campuses with no real perimeter buildings, no boundaries.

- DP: most campuses in the country are open: all of the aforementioned systems and devices are mitigation strategies themselves.
- SH: awareness with your campus community about what it should be looking for in terms of suspicious activity: has to be an essential component of the overall physical security program ⇒ theme of education and doing a better job of educating our campus community.
- DP: “See something, say something.”

- **Lighting as a deterrent:**
  - How can lighting work to your advantage? How can it work as prevention?
  - DP: lighting is a good way to deter crime: Great data online

- **Advice around old buildings:**
  - Old buildings that are configured now in multiple fashions, how do you assess if an aspect of that building (a door, for example) is a problem?
  - How can we redesign the interiors of the old buildings that have been remodeled/refitted/repurposed on a yearly basis?
  - DP: consult with your facilities folks: What are the options? Is (the aspect) bad? If it’s a bad thing, then can I change it and what will it take to do that? If you don’t have your own security folks, you can work with the police department, (a crime prevention specialist or physical security specialist).

- **Best practices in local mobile communications:**
  - Multiple sites, wireless communications: seems like a simple thing but when there are multiple devices, it rapidly gets complicated.
  - Not concerned about mass communication but communications between staff in an emergency.
  - DP: radio system is very effective; use multiple channels, or a code for an emergency.
    - In classrooms: telephones are more popular: cheaper and quicker.
    - Have at least one telephone line to the security office.
    - Experience with “listen in” technology: use this to listen in if something is going wrong in a classroom.
    - Video conference phones in classrooms
    - Cell phones on speaker
    - Technology that teachers can use from a desk
    - PC or MAC based system to send out an emergency signal/alarm to a certain destination.
  - SH: Talk to the local security integrator
- Get them to do a demo
- Go to a regional local security vendor/show/conference

**Andrea: Questions/ Comments about the Ask:**
- Are there ballpark prices of the security implementations?
  - SH: Yes
- What is the deadline date?
  - 1/25
- Is this just for physical security aspects?
  - Andrea: Yes. Because this is the short session, they are only asking for physical security aspects
- Audience Comment: PACE insurance, Small Districts Association of Oregon (SDAO): institutions to use as resources.
  - GD: Salem-Keizer is a good resource in Oregon.
- Comment: there is a statewide threat assessment consortium bill for k-12 ONLY.
- Andrea: confidentiality counseling and how it can be problematic.
- Audience member to colleagues: It would be helpful if we could be unified and focused in what we need so that we could be more successful in getting what we need.
- Bonds: possible that they may have to match (money).
  - Trying to get lobby dollars.
  - But if that doesn’t work they may have to match.
  - February session: opportunity for match is urgent.
Post-Presentation Critical Issues Discussion:

SH: what do you think collectively are your priorities coming out of this session?

SH: Physical security is the consensus agreement: could be any one of the things that DP listed.

- **Electrical systems to support the electrical improvements:**
  - Big priority for audience.
  - Line of sight pathways need cables below, etc.
  - Infrastructure to support campus lighting for security purposes: trenching, cabling, power.
  - Could need infrastructure for the cameras too.
  - System enhancements to support the new technology.
  - Secondary systems/backup systems/ redundant systems

- **Emergency communications:**
  - Classroom communication: “We cannot converse with the classrooms” ⇒ need to be able to contact the classrooms.
  - Duress/panic button
    - DP: determine which locations and priorities warrant the panic button: Cash handling locations/ classrooms/ offices where there are individuals who may be involved with troubled students/ financial aid/ counseling/registrar.
    - DP: Difficulties in management: while panic buttons are a good device, they are a system to manage. Someone has to replace the batteries, or you have to pay for the subscription, etc.
  - Key staff communication: during an emergency, how do they communicate?
    - (talk-abouts, two way radios)
  - What do you do for external enunciation of emergencies?
    - Lots of acreage and some may not hear the internal shelter alarms.
    - DP: we hope the mass notification system will work.
      - DP: If not, a giant PA System, siren is a good choice: Giant voice
      - DP: You can have a siren for multiple things: have a siren for a big event, and then use Giant Voice for other emergencies.
      - DP: This system is costly: $100,000 system for about a 100-acre campus.

- **Security Cameras:**
  - SH: Do you want Security Cameras? :
    - YES
  - Majority of audience: want cameras that both monitor the population and record for post-incident investigation.
- The price for recording the video can vary and can be expensive.
- DP: if you want BOTH you want: Combination of fixed cameras with day/night capability:
  - SH: replacement value!
  - DP: 7-8 years for an IP based camera

- Locking Doors:
  - Internal access control
  - Classroom/office access control
  - DP: Access control: readers can be there forever
  - DP: If you have existing infrastructure, a great item is the Wi-Fi lock.
    - DP: Why are they great? Cheaper to install then hardwire ⇒ when technology changes you don’t have to change the whole locking mechanism, you just replace little pieces of the lock. 2-3-factor authentication: card, pin code, both in sequence with each other, or none. You don’t have to run wiring and drill holes in the wall.
    - They work off batteries⇒ there is an expense:
      - Installed they cost $1800 per door
  - Classroom locks:
    - DP: Wi-Fi locks are online ⇒ not a big draw on the network
    - DP: You can also unlock the traditional hard way
    - DP: Keep the door locked all the time: recommendation
    - DP: Part of the system is handing out credentials
  - SH: what if the person carrying out violence is a student who has access to a class building/room?
  - SH: Other, low-tech ways to lock doors?
    - DP: basic, one-hand turn deadbolt: quick, easy, unlocks from the outside, key to the lock, police department can get in.
  - Infrastructure to manage the system:
    - Audience: this is a problem
    - DP: Someone in the organization needs to handle the system and if you don’t have someone to do that you have to hire another person.
  - CONCERN: I NEED A NO-MANAGEMENT INCREASE, SELF-DIRECTED LOCKING DOOR.
    - Having non-tech solutions on the list: we’re looking for something anyone can lock.
    - SH: Try a hybrid system
    - SH: You can make that your ask: we want an access control system.
      - Concern: if that system works on the network, we have a network but it’s not always reliable.
      - SH: that’s a bigger problem.
  - SH: maybe this year you ask for an online access control system and next year you build off of it.
  - ADA officer and fire marshal: can tell you if you’re installing locks properly.
- **Landscape as a deterrent:**
  - We want a deterrent that’s not a razor wire fence: Territorial reinforcement.
  - DP: recommend: how do you identify you’re on someone’s property? lighting stream, signage (directing to visitor’s center), road: have a garbage can or a dog pole that has bags (or some variation of this) to constantly remind someone they’re on your property.
  - Closer to the core of campus: separate visitor parking from faculty/staff parking.
    - Restrict access to those lots if possible.
  - Put visitors in a lot that’s not controlled.
  - Parking is very important: a lot of incidents where there are violent intruders start with someone illegally parked.

- **Existing buildings vs. new infrastructure:**
  - How do you fix existing buildings/create mitigation strategies?
  - SH: Do any of you have classrooms and class buildings that have glass doors/walls?
    - Comment: We use 3m film that’s shatter resistant: takes care of bullets and earthquakes: keeps the glass from shattering (not bullet proof).
  - DP: If you have a sidelight? Can someone get through it if they break the window, can I use a film or a decorative covering that deters someone from getting in?
    - DP: New construction: are there alternative ways that we can mitigate for the sidelight? Can we move the glass above eye-line?
    - DP: Never ask people to retrofit buildings.
    - DP: Mitigation strategies should be put in place.
  - DP: Doors that open inward vs. outward:
    - Barricade the door even if the door opens outwards: it stops the intruder even momentarily.

- **Behavioral Intervention Teams (BIT) vs. Threat assessment Management (TAM) teams**
  - GD: the trouble with the “teams” is that we’re using terms interchangeably when some things refer to specific methodology.
    - GD: BIT: using credible technology/methodology
    - GD: There are some teams that are using old FBI methodologies as threat assessment and BIT etc.
    - GD: If there’s a methodology that’s being advanced for you, is it a good methodology? Is it credible?
      - • Use the resources that GD listed
    - GD: Look for where there’s validation of the use of a specific practice.
  - BIT vs. TAM:
    - GD: what’s the mission here?
• GD: BIT vs. TAM: on a day-to-day basis there are student needs that do not involve a threat for violence.
• GD: Student services: multi-disciplinary services that become more efficient over time.
• GD: Need to keep in mind that the standards that have developed around violence protection on campus have said that campuses should have threat assessment management policies. The standards are around higher-end violence risk incidents, not the usual student services.
  o GD: don’t forget the training and community awareness: without the training these systems don’t work.
    ▪ GD: Think through the implications that go along with the system (The training that goes with it).
  o SH: include implementation cost: can include training.
  o GD: All-threats process:
    ▪ GD: Privacy issues around employee issues
    ▪ GD: Any business can set up processes that support business necessities.
    ▪ GD: If you designate a group your Threat Assessment group, then part of their role is handling sensitive/confidential information, and they are responsible for that.
      • GD: If someone who handles confidential information “has a big mouth,” you need to deal with that. That’s unacceptable.
  o GD: If you have two teams and two processes, then you have two teams you have to train.
  o Also, the threat cases do not only threaten one subgroup of the population: the student threats affect the staff and vice versa.
    ▪ GD: “I cannot come up with a compelling reason why you would separate faculty and student threats.”